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Abstract
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary
process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with
a uniformly large basin of attraction independently of the size of the population. Moreover,
we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they
cooperate.
1 Introduction
The theory of innitely repeated games has been very inuential in the social sciences showing
how repeated interaction can provide agents with incentives to overcome opportunistic behavior.
However, a usual criticism of this theory is that there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. While
cooperation can be supported in equilibrium when agents are suciently patient, there are also
equilibria with no cooperation. Moreover, a variety of dierent punishment can be used to support
cooperation.
To solve this multiplicity problem, we study what types of strategies will have a large basin of
attraction regardless of what other strategies are considered in the evolutionary dynamic. More
precisely, we study the replicator dynamic over arbitrary nite set of innitely repeated strategies
in which in every round of the game the strategy makes a mistake with a small probability 1 − p.
We study which strategies have a non vanishing basin of attraction with a uniform size regardless of
the set of strategies being consider in the population. We say that that a strategy has a uniformly
large basin of attraction if it repeals invasions of a given size for arbitrarily patient players and
small probability of errors and for any possible combination of alternative strategies (see denition
3 for details).
We nd that two well known strategies, always defect and grim, do not have uniformly large
basins of attraction. Moreover, any strategy that does not forgive cannot have a uniformly large
basin either. The reason is that, as players become arbitrarily patient and the probability of errors
becomes small, unforgiving strategies lose in payos relative to strategies that forgive and the size
of the basins of attraction between these two strategies will favor the forgiving one. This is the case
even when the ineciencies happen o the equilibrium path (as it is the case for grim).
Moreover, we show that symmetric strategies leading to inecient payos even when players
are arbitrarily patient and the probability of errors is suciently small cannot have uniformly large
basins of attractions.
However, it could be the case that inecient and unforgiving strategies do not have uniformly
large basins since actually there may be no strategies with that property! We prove that that is not
the case by showing that the strategy win-stay-loose-shift has a uniformly large basin of attraction,
provided a suciently small probability of mistakes. As this strategy is ecient (and symmetric),
we show that the concept of uniformly large basins of attraction provides a (partial) solution to the
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long studied problem of equilibrium selection in innitely repeated games: only ecient equilibria
survive for patient players if we focus on symmetric strategies. We suspect that the eciency result
can be extended to non-symmetric strategies in which case the concept of uniformly large basin of
attraction would provide a complete solution to the problem of equilibrium selection in innitely
repeated games.
Note that we not only provide equilibrium selection at the level of payos but also at the level of
the type of strategies used to support those payos: the payos from mutual cooperation can only
be supported by strategies that do not involve asymptotically inecient punishments. This provides
theoretical support to Axelrod's claims ([Ax]) that successful strategies should be cooperative and
forgiving.
In addition, in our study of the replicator dynamics we develop technologies that can be used
to analyze the basins of attractions outside of the particular case of innitely repeated games. In
fact the results are based in a series of theorems about general replicator dynamics which can be
used to study the robustness of steady states for games in general. In addition, we prove that our
results are robust to perturbation of the replicator dynamic provided that it is still the case that
the only growing strategies are those that perform better than the average.
An extensive previous literature has addressed the multiplicity problem in innitely repeated
games. Part of this literature focuses on strategies of nite complexity with costs of complexity to
select a subset of equilibria (see Rubinstein [R], Abreu and Rubinstein [AR], Binmore and Samuelson
[BiS], Cooper [C] and Volij [V]). This literature nds that the selection varies with the equilibrium
concept being used and the type of cost of complexity. Another literature appealed to ideas of
evolutionary stability as a way to select equilibria and found that no strategy is evolutionary stable
in the innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (Boyd and Lorberbaum [BL]). The reason is that for
any strategy there exist another strategy that diers only after events that are not reached by this
pair of strategies. As such, the payo from both strategies is equal when playing with each other
and the original strategy cannot be an attractor of an evolutionary dynamic. Bendor and Swistak
([BeS]) circumvent the problem of ties by weakening the stability concept and show that cooperative
and retaliatory strategies are the most robust to invasions.
In a dierent approach to deal with the problem of ties, Boyd ([B]) introduced the idea of errors
in decision making. If there is a small probability of errors in every round, then all events in a
game occur with positive probability destroying the certainty of ties allowing for some strategies to
be evolutionary stable. However, as shown by Boyd ([B]) and Kim ([Ki]), many strategies that are
sub-game perfect for a given level of patience and errors can also be evolutionary stable.
Fudenberg and Maskin ([FM2]) (see also Fudenberg and Maskin [FM]) show that evolutionary
stability can have equilibrium selection implications if we ask that the size of invasions that the strat-
egy can repel to be uniformly large with respect to any alternative strategy and for large discount
factors and small probabilities of mistakes. They show that the only strategies with characteristic
must be cooperative. There are two main dierences with our contributions. First, Fudenberg and
Maskin ([FM2]) focus on strategies of nite complexity while our eciency result does not have
that restriction, it applies only to symmetric strategies. Second, our robustness concept not only
consider the robustness to invasion by a single alternative strategy but also robustness to invasion
by any arbitrary combination of alternative strategies. In other words, we also look at the size of
the basin of attraction inside the simplex.
Finally, Johnson, Levine and Pesendorfer ([JLP]), Volij ([V]) and Levine and Pesendorfer ([LP])
use the idea of stochastic stability (Kandori, Mailath and Rob [KMR] and Young [YP]) to select
equilibria in innitely repeated games.
We wonder if the present result could be useful to formulate experiment that could help to
understand if individuals, when playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma, behave in the way that
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replicator equation assumes. In particular, if win-stay-loose-shift is highly present in a designed
experiment, is it going to become prevalent?
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the innite repeated prisoner's
dilemma with trembles. In section 3 we start recalling the denition of replicator dynamics in any
dimension and in theorem 1 we give sucient conditions to be satised by a payo matrix for a vertex
to have a large local basin of attraction independent of the dimension of the matrix. Moreover, in
subsection 3.4 we show that the conditions of theorem 1 are also necessary. In section 4 we recast
the replicator dynamics in the context of innite repeated prisoner's dilemma with trembles. In this
section we dene the notion of strategy having a uniformly large basin of attraction (see denition
3). In section 5 we show that grim does not have a uniformly large basin. In section 6 we prove that
for any history, the frequency of cooperation converges to one for symmetric strategies that have
a uniform large basin of attraction. In section 7 we show how to adapt theorem 1 to the context
of the set of all the strategies. In particular, in subsection 7.1 it is provided sucient condition
to guarantee that a strategy has a uniform large basin of attraction. These conditions basically
consist in analyzing all the possible set of three strategies; moreover, in subsection 7.2 we show
that weaker conditions that consists in comparing sets of two strategies is not enough to have a
uniformly large basin of attraction. In section 8 we develop a technique to calculate the payo
with trembles for certain type of strategies (see denition 10) provided certain restriction on the
probability of mistakes (see lemma 15). In section 9 we apply this techniques for the particular case
of win-stay-loose-shift, proving that it has a uniformly large basin of attraction. We also consider
in subsection 9.1 a generalization of win-stay-loose-shift. In subsection 10 we show that theorem 1
can be reproved for a general type of equation that resembles the replicator dynamics.
2 Innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with trembles
In the present section, we state the denitions of the game rst without trembles and later with
trembles. We also explain and how the payo is calculated whit and without trembles.
In each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... the 2 agents play a symmetric stage game with action space A =
{C,D}. At each period t player one choose action at ∈ A and second player choose action bt ∈ A. We
denote the vector of actions until time t as at = (a
0, a1, . . . , at) for player one and bt = (b
0, b1, . . . , bt)
for player two. The payo from the stage game at time t is given by utility function u(at, bt) :
A × A → < for player one and u(bt, at) : A × A → < for player two such that u(D,C) = T ,
u(C,C) = R, u(D,D) = P , u(C,D) = S, with T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S.
Agents observe previous actions and this knowledge is summarized by histories. When the game
begins we have the null history h0 = (a0, b0), afterwards ht = (at−1, bt−1) = ((a
0, b0), . . . (at−1, bt−1))
and Ht is the space of all possible t histories. Let H∞ be the set of all possible histories. A pure
strategy is a function s : H∞ → A. In other words, a pure strategy s is a functions s : Ht → A for
all t.
It is important to remark, that given two strategies s1, s2 and a nite path ht = (at−1, bt−1), if
s1 encounter s2 then
ht = (s1(ht), s2(ĥt)),
where
ĥt := (bt−1, at−1). (1)
Given a pair of strategies (s1, s2) we call the history they generate as their equilibrium path and
denote it as hs1,s2 . In other words, denoting with hs1,s2 t the path up to period t then equilibrium
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path hs1,s2 , is the path that veries
s1(hs1,s2 t) = a
t, s2(ĥs1,s2 t) = b
t.
Given a pair of strategies s1, s2 the utility of the agent s1 is
U(s1, s2) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtu(s1(hs1,s2 t), s2(ĥs1,s2 t)),
where the common and constant discount factor δ < 1.
Given a nite path ht, with hs1,s2/ht we denote the equilibrium path between s1 and s2 with
seed ht Given the recursivity of the discounted utility function we can write the utility starting from





For the case of trembles, we have the probability of making a mistake, more precisely, with a
positive p < 1 we denote the probability that a strategy perform what intends. Now, given two
strategies s1, s2 (they can be the same strategy) we dene





where u(at, bt) denotes the usual payo of the pair (at, bt) and ps1,s2(at, bt) denote the probability
that the strategies s1 and s2 go through the path ht = (at, bt) when they are playing one to each
other. To dene ps1,s2(at, bt) we proceed inductively:
ps1,s2(at, bt) = ps1,s2(at−1, bt−1)p
it+jt(1− p)1−it+1−jt (2)
where
(i) it = 1 if a
t = s1(ht), it = 0 otherwise,
(ii) jt = 1 if b
t = s2(ĥt−1), jt = 0 otherwise.
Therefore,
ps1,s2(at, bt) = p
mt+nt(1− p)2t+2−mt−nt
where
mt = Cardinal{0 6 i 6 t : s1(hi) = ai}
nt = Cardinal{0 6 i 6 t : s2(ĥi) = bi}.





we denote the utility only along the equilibrium path. With Uδ,p,hcs1,s2
(s1, s2) we denote the dier-
ence, i.e., Uδ,p(s1, s2)− Uδ,p,hs1,s2 (s1, s2). Now, given a nite string ht with
Uδ,p(s1, s2/ht)
we denote the utility with seed ht and with
Uδ,p(hs1,s2/ht)




) we denote Uδ,p(s1, s2/ht) − Uδ,p(hs1,s2/ht). Also, with NE we denote the
set of path which are not equilibrium paths; usually those paths are called second order paths.
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Denition 1. We say that s is a subgame perfect strategy if for any s′dierent than s it follows
that if s(ht) 6= s′(ht) then
Uδ,p(s, s/ht)− Uδ,p(s′, s/ht) > 0.
Let us consider two strategies s1 and s2 and let
Rs1,s2 := {h ∈ H0 : ∃ k > 0, s1(ht) = s2(ht) ∀ t < k; s1(hk) 6= s2(hk)}.
Observe that if s1(h0) 6= s2(h0) then any path h ∈ H0 belongs to Rs1,s2 . On the other hand, if
s1(0) = s2(0) then for any h ∈ Rs1,s2 there is not restriction on the values that h0 can take. In
other words, we consider all the paths where s1 and s2 dier at some moment, including the rst
move. Observe that k depends on h, and it is dened as the rst time that s1 diers with s2 along
h, i.e.
kh(s1, s2) = min{t > 0 : s1(ht) 6= s2(ht)}.
From now on, to avoid notation we drop the dependence on the path. Observe that for h ∈ Rs1,s2 ,
the fact that s1(ht) = s2(ht) for any t < k does not imply that ht+1 = s1(ht). Moreover, observe
also that if s1 6= s2 then
Rs1,s2 6= ∅.
From now on, given h ∈ Rs1,s2 with hk we denote the nite path contained in h such that s1(ht) =
s2(ht) for any t < k and s1(hk) 6= s2(hk)
Lemma 1. It follows that
Uδ,p(s1, s1)− Uδ,p(s2, s1) =
∑
hk,h∈Rs1,s2
δkps1,s1(hk)(Uδ,p(s1, s1/hk)− Uδ,p(s2, s1/hk)).
Proof. If s1(h0) 6= s2(h0) then Rs1,s2 = H0, hk = h0 and in this case there is nothing to prove. If
s1(0) = s2(0), the result follows from the next claim that states that given a history path h then
ps1,s1(ht) =
{
ps2,s1(ht) if t 6 k
ps2,s1(hk)ps2,s1/hk(σ
k(h)t−k) = ps1,s1(hk)ps2,s1/hk(σ
k(h)t−k) if t > k
(recall that σk(h) is a history path that veries σk(h)j = hj+k). To prove the claim in the case that
t 6 k we proceed by induction: recalling (2)follows that
ps1,s1(at, bt) = ps1,s1(at−1, bt−1)p
i1t+j
1
t (1− p)2−i1t−j1t (4)
where
(i) i1t = 1 if at = s1(ht−1) = s1(at−1, bt−1), i
1
t = 0 otherwise,
(ii) j1t = 1 if bt = s1(ĥt−1) = s1(bt−1, at−1), j
1
t = 0 otherwise
and
ps2,s1(at, bt) = ps2,s1(at−1, bt−1)p
i2t+j
2
t (1− p)2−i2t−j2t (5)
where
(i) i2t = 1 if at = s2(ht−1) = s2(at−1, bt−1), i
2
t = 0 otherwise,
(ii) j2t = 1 if bt = s1(ĥt−1) = s1(bt−1, at−1), j
2
t = 0 otherwise.
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Now, by induction follows that ps1,s1(at−1, bt−1) = ps2,s1(at−1, bt−1) and from s1(ht−1) = s2(ht−1)







Remark 1. It follows that h ∈ Rs1,s2 if and only if h ∈ Rs2,s1 and
Uδ,p(s2, s2)− Uδ,p(s1, s2) =
∑
hk,h∈Rs1,s2
δkps2,s2(hk)(Uδ,p(s2, s2/hk)− Uδ,p(s1, s2/hk)). (6)





where M = max{T, |S|}.
Proof. Observe that xed t then ∑
ht∈Ht
ps1,s2(ht) = 1,
since in the equilibrium path at time t the probability is p2t+2 it follows that∑
ht /∈Ht∩NE
ps1,s2(ht) = 1− p2t+2.



















= M [(1− δ)
∑
t>0











From previous lemma, we can conclude the next two lemmas:





Uδ,p(s1, s2/ht) = 0.
Lemma 4. given s1s2 then





Now, we are going to rewrite the equation (6) considering at the same time the paths h and ĥ.
The reason to do that it will become more clear in subsection 7.1.
Remark 2. Observe that given a strategy s if ĥt 6= ht it could hold that s(ĥt) 6= s(ht). Also,
given two strategies s1, s2 it also could hold that kh(s1, s2) 6= kĥ(s1, s2). However, it follows that if
kh(s1, s2) 6 kĥ(s1, s2) then
ps1,s1(hk) = ps1,s1(ĥk) = ps1,s2(hk) = ps1,s2(ĥk) =
ps2,s1(hk) = ps2,s1(ĥk) = ps2,s2(hk) = ps2,s2(ĥk)
Using previous remark, we dene the set R∗s1,s2 as the set
R∗s1,s2 = {h ∈ Rs1,s2 : kh(s1, s2) 6 kĥ(s1, s2)}
and therefore the dierences Uδ,p(s2, s2)−Uδ,p(s1, s2) can be written in the following way (denoting
k as kh(s1, s2))
Uδ,p(s2, s2)− Uδ,p(s1, s2) =∑
hk,h∈R∗s1,s2
δkps1,s1(hk)[Uδ,p(s1, s1/hk)− Uδ,p(s2, s1/hk) + Uδ,p(s1, s1/ĥk)− Uδ,p(s2, s1/ĥk)].
Now we are going to give a series of lemmas that relates equilibrium paths with seeds ht and ĥt;
later, we also relate the payo along those paths. The proofs of the rst two next lemmas are
obvious and left to the reader.
Lemma 5. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path ht follows that
ĥs∗,s/ht = hs,s∗/ĥt (7)
Now, we try to relates the payos. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path hk, we take
b1 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hk)=R




b3 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hk)=T




Observe that b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1 and
U(s∗, s) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P.
In the same way, for ĥk we dene b̂1, b̂2, b̂3, b̂4
b1 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/ĥk)=R




b3 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/ĥk)=T




Observe that b̂1 + b̂2 + b̂3 + b̂4 = 1. Now we dene
B1 = b1 + b̂1, B2 = b2 + b̂2, B3 = b3 + b̂3, B4 = b4 + b̂4.
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Remark 3. The above numbers bj depend on δ and the innite sums converge xed δ. However,
they could not converge as δ goes to 1.
Lemma 6. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path hk, if
Uδ(hs∗,s/hk) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4PS
then
Uδ(hs,s∗/ĥk) = b1R+ b2T + b3S + b4P.
Moreover, if
Uδ(hs∗,s/hk) + Uδ(hs∗,s/ĥk) = B1R+B2T +B3S +B4P,
then
Uδ(hs,s∗/hk) + Uδ(hs,s∗/ĥk) = B1R+B2S +B3T +B4P.
Lemma 7. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path hk, follows that
Uδ(hs,s∗/hk) + Uδ(hs∗,s/ĥk) 6 2R.
Lemma 8. For any λ0 < 1 follows that there exists λ̂0 < 1 such that if Uδ(hs,s/ht) = λ0R then
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/ĥt) 6 2λ̂0R.
Moreover, if λ′0 < λ0 then λ̂
′
0 < λ̂0. In particular,
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/ĥt) < 2R.
Proof. If Uδ(hs,s/ht) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P = λ0R then it follows that




In fact, if it is not the case,
b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P > b1R = (1− (b2 + b3 + b4)) > [1− (1− λ0)]R = λ0R,
a contradiction. From equality (7) follows U(hs,s/ĥt) = b1R+ b2T + b3S + b4P so
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/ĥt) = 2b1R+ (b2 + b3)(T + S) + 2b4P
and from the fact that b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1 follows that is equal to
2R− [2b2(R− P ) + (b3 + b4)(2R− (T + S))]
So taking
R̂ = min{R− P, R− (T + S)
2
}
which is positive, follows from inequality (8) that













In this section we introduce the notion of replicator dynamics and we analyze the attractors.
Given the payo matrix
A =

a11 . . . a1i . . . a1n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ai1 . . . aii . . . ain
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
an1 . . . ani . . . ann

Let ∆ be the n−dimensional simplex
∆ = {(x1 . . . xn) ∈ Rn : x1 + · · ·+ xn = 1, xj > 0,∀j}.
We consider the replicator dynamics X associated to the payo matrix A on the n dimensional
simplex given by the equations:
ẋj = Xj(x) := xjFj(x) = xj(fj − f̄)(x) (9)
where




where (AX)j denotes the j−th coordinate of the vector Ax. In other words, provided a payo
matrix A, the replicator equation is given by
ẋj = xj [(Ax)j − xtAx], j = 1, . . . , n
where xt denotes the transpose vector.
Using that 1 = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn we can write






We denote with ϕ the associated ow:
ϕ : R×∆ → ∆.
Giving t ∈ R with ϕt : ∆ → ∆ we denote the t− time dieomorphism. Observe that any vertex is
a singularity of the replicator equation, therefore, any vertex is a xed point of the ow.
3.1 Ane coordinates for the replicator equation
We consider an ane change of coordinates to dene the dynamics in the positive quadrant of Rn−1




xj , x̄j = xj ∀ j > 2
and so, the replicator equation is dened as
ẋj = Fj(x̄)xj , j = 2, . . . , n
9
where x̄ = (x̄1, x̄2 . . . , x̄n) with xi > 0, x2 + · · ·+ xn 6 1 and
Fj(x̄) = (fj − f̄)(1−
∑
i>2
xi, x2, . . . , xn).
Observe that in these coordinates the point e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) corresponds to (0, . . . , 0) and in the
new coordinates the simplex ∆ is replaced by {(x2, . . . , xn) : xi > 0,
∑n
i=2 xi 6 1}.



















= (fj − f1)(x̄)−
∑
l>2




= (fj − f1)(x̄)− (fj − f1)(x̄)xj +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
[(fj − fl)(x̄)− (fj − f1)(x̄)]xl
















(f1 − fl)(x̄)xl, (10)
it follows that
Fj(x̄) = (fj − f1)(x̄) +R(x̄) (11)
where
(fj − fl)(x̄) =
∑
k>1











= aj1 − al1 +
∑
k>2
(ajk − alk − aj1 + al1)xk.
Observe that if we take the matrix M ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1) and the vector N ∈ R(n− 1) such that
Mjk = ajk − a1k + a11 − aj1
and






Figure 1: Attracting xed point. Basin of attraction.
then the replicator equation o ane coordintaes is given by
ẋj = xj [(v +Mx)j − xt(v +Mx)], j = 2, . . . , n; (12)
where (v +Mx)j is the j − th coordinate of v +Mx.
3.2 Attracting xed points
Given a point e and a positive constant ε, Bε(e) denotes the ball of radius ε and center e.
Denition 2. Attracting xed point and local basin of attraction. Let e be a singular point
of X (i.e.: X(e) = 0). It is said that e is an attractor if there exists an open neighborhood U of
e such that for any x ∈ U follows that ϕt(x) → e. The global basin of attraction Bs(e) is the set
of points that its forward trajectories converges to e. Moreover, given ε > 0 we say that Bε(e) is
contained in the local basin of attraction of e if Bε(e) is contained in global basin of attraction and
any forward trajectory starting in Bε(e) remains inside Bε(e). This is denoted with Bε(e) ⊂ Bsloc(e).
For the sake of completeness, we give a folklore's sucient condition for the vertex e1 to be an
attractor. Before that, we need to calculate the derivativeDX of the functionX = (X1 . . . Xn) given
by the replicator equation (see equation 9). For that, for any l, we compute DXl = (
∂Xl
∂x1
. . . ∂Xl∂xn )




(∂xlfl − ∂xl f̄)xl + fl − f̄ .
Lemma 9. If e1 is a strict Nash equilibrium (i.e. a11 − aj1 > 0 for any j 6= 1) then e1 is an
attractor. Moreover, the eigenvalues of DX at e1 are given by {a11 − aj1}j>1.
Proof. To prove the result, observe rst that 0̄ (the point e1 in the simplex) is a xed point. To
nish, observe that D0X is a diagonal matrix with {aj1 − a11}j 6=1 in the diagonal. Therefore,
{aj1 − a11}j 6=1 are the eigenvalues which by hypothesis they are all negative.
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3.3 Large Basin of attractions for xed points
The goal of the following theorem is to give sucient conditions for a vertex to have a large
local basin of attraction, independent of the dimension of the space. In other words, provided a
vertex e and a positive number K, the goal is to nd sucient condition for any payo matrix A,
independently of the dimension, the neighborhood BR(e) is contained in the local basin of attraction
of e.
A natural condition is to assume that the eigenvalues are uniformly negative. But this criterion
is not appropriate for the context of games, since the quantities aj1− a11 even when negative could
be arbitrary close to zero. However, we take advantage that the replicator equations are given by
a special type of cubic polynomials, and we provide a sucient condition for large local basin of
attraction even for the case that the eigenvalues are close to zero. To do that, we need to introduce





Now, let us go back to the replicator equations and let us assume from now on that e is a strict
Nash equilibrium, i.e.
a11 − aj1 > 0
for any j 6= 1. Recall as we dene in the previous subsection the matrix M and N given by
Nj1 = aj1 − a11 (13)
Mij = aji − a1i + a11 − aj1 (14)
. Mji = aij − a1j + a11 − ai1. (15)
Moreover, we assume that the vertex {e2 . . . en} are ordered in such a way that
a11 − ai1 > a11 − aj1, ∀ 2 6 i < j.
















The proof of the theorem is based on a crucial lemma about quadratic polynomials (see lemma
10). So, rst we recall a series of denitions and results involving quadric, we state the lemma,
provide its proof and latter we prove theorem 1.
First recall that a quadratic polynomial Q is a function from Rn to R of the form Q(x) =
Nx+xtMx (where N is a vector, M is a square matrix and xt means the transpose of x). It is said
that Q is positive dened if xtMx > 0 for any x. It is said that Q is negative-denite if xtMx 6 0
for any x. Now, associated to a quadratic polynomial Q we consider the set
{x ∈ Rn : Q(x) = 0}
which is smooth submanifold of codimension one. Observe that Q(0) = 0. If Q is either positive-





















Figure 2: Q positive-denite, negative-denite and neither.
set and {x ∈ Rn : Q(x) 6 0} is a convex set (see rst two cases in gure 2). If Q is neither
positive-denite nor negative-denite then {Q(x) = 0} is a hyperboloid, and in particular, it is not
a bounded set. However, it could be connected or not (see third case of gure 2).
Lemma 10. Let Q : Rn → R given by
Q(x) = Nx+ xtMx
with x ∈ Rn, N ∈ Rn and M ∈ Rn×n. Let us assume that Ni < 0 for any i and for any j > i,






Then, the set ∆ 1
M0





} is contained in {x : Q(x) < 0}. In particular,
if M0 = 0 then
1
M0
is treated as ∞ and this means that {x ∈ Rn : xi > 0} ⊂ {x : Q(x) 6 0}.
Proof. For any v ∈ Rn such that vi > 0 and
∑
i vi = 1, we consider the following one dimensional
quadratic polynomial, Qv : R → R given by
Qv(s) := Q(sv) = sNv + s2vtMv.
To prove the thesis of the lemma, we claim that is enough to show that
for any positive vector v with norm equal to 1, if 0 < s <
1
M0
thenQv(s) < 0; (17)
in fact, to prove that claim, we can argue by contradiction: if there is a point x0 ∈ ∆ 1
M0
dierent
than zero (i.e.: 0 < |x0| < 1M0 ) such that Q(x0) = 0, then taking v =
x0
|x0| and s = |x0| follows that
Qv(s) = Nx0 + x
t
0Mx0 = 0, but |v| = 1, s < 1M0 , a contradiction.









If vtMv < 0 then it follows that Qv is a one dimensional quadratic polynomial with negative
quadratic term and two non-positive roots, so for any s > 0 holds that Qv(s) < 0 and therefore
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proving the claim in this case. So, it remains to consider the case that vtMv > 0. In this case,
since Qv is a one dimensional quadratic polynomial with positive quadratic term (vtMv), therefore







































Therefore, (18) holds and so proving (17).
Now we provide the proof of theorem 1.
Proof of theorem 1: We consider the ane change of coordinates: x̄1 = 1 −
∑
j>2 xj , x̄j = xj , j =
2, . . . , n introduced before. Let X = (X2, . . . , Xn) the vector eld in these coordinates, where
Xj = x̄jFj(x̄). For any k < 1 we denote
∆k := {x̄ :
∑
i>2




We want to show that for any initial condition x̄ in the region ∆ 1
M0
follows that the map




is a strict decreasing function and so the trajectories remains inside ∆ 1
M0
and since it can not escape
∆ it follows that x̄(t) → 0 and therefore the trajectory converge to (0, . . . , 0). To do that, we prove
˙̄x < 0.
Therefore, we have to show






xjFj(x̄) < 0. (19)
Recall that Fj = (fj − f1)(x̄) + R(x̄) where R(x̄) =
∑























(fj − f1)(x̄)xj +R(x̄)k.
Recalling the expression of R we get that
Q(x̄) = (1− k)
∑
j>2
(fj − f1)(x̄)xj .
So, to prove inequality (19) is enough to show that
Q(x̄) = (1− k)
∑
j




First we rewrite Q. Observe that
(fj − f1)(x̄) =
∑
i
(aji − a1i)x̄i =
= aj1 − a11 +
∑
i>2
(aji − a1i + a11 − aj1)xi.
If we note the vector
N := (aj1 − a11)j
and the matrix
M := (Mij) = aji − a1i + a11 − aj1.
Therefore,
Q(x̄) = Nx̄+ x̄tMx̄.
So we have to nd the region given by {x̄ : Q(x̄) = 0}. To deal with it, we apply lemma 10 and we
use equation (16) and the theorem is concluded.
Remark 4. Observe that in the theorem 10 it only matters to compare a11 − ai1 with the entries
Mij +Mji that are positive.
Remark 5. If we apply the proof of lemma 10 to the particular case that v = ej, we are considering
the map
Qv(s) = s[aj1 − a11 + (ajj − a1j + a11 − aj1) s]
and Q(s) = 0 if and only if s = 0 or
s =
a11 − aj1








Q(s) < 0, ∀ 0 < s < p1j .
In particular, if we apply this to theorem 10, it follows that the whole segment [0, p1j) is in the basin
of attraction of e1. In particular, observe that p̂1j = (1 − p1j , . . . , p1j . . . ), is the xed point of the
replicator dynamics dierent than e1, ej inside the one dimensional simplex that contains e1, ej.
Remark 6. Observe that the basin of attraction could be much larger than the region given by the
previous theorem. It may be the case that better linear upper bounds for the quadratics map Fj could
provide better estimates for the size of the basin of attraction.
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3.4 Comparing strategies by pairs is not enough
It is natural to wonder if conditions of theorem 10 are necessary? More precisely, is it true that if
M0 is small then the basin of attraction is small? Related to this question, we provide the following
theorem that shows that is not enough to bound by below the basin of attraction only considering
populatios of two strategies. In other words, it is possible to show examples of strategies such that
the basin of attraction of e1 restricted to the axis are large but the whole basin is not large.
We consider a replicator dynamics in dimension two and we write the equation in ane coor-
dinates. Given λ > 0 and close to zero, we consider the almost horizontal and vertical lines given
by
Hλ(x1) = (x1, λ(1− x1), Vλ(x2) = (λ(1− x2), x2).
Theorem 2. Given λ > 0 close to zero, a > 0 there exist A ∈ R3×3 such that 0 < aij < a, satisfying
that
(i) (0, 0) is an attractor and the horizontal line (x1, 0), 0 6 x1 < 1 and vertical line (0, x2), 0 6
x2 < 1 are contained in the basin of attraction of (0, 0);
(ii) (1, 0) and (0, 1) are repellers;
(iii) there is a point p = (p1, p2) with p1 + p2 = 1 which is an attractor;
(iv) the region bounded by Hλ, Vλ and x1 + x2 = 1 is contained in the basin of attraction of p.
Proof. To prove the result, we are going to choose A ∈ R3×3 in a proper way such that for any
(x2, x3) ∈ Hλ and (x2, x3) ∈ Vλ follows that X(x2, x3) points towards the region bounded by Hλ, Vλ






, F3(H(x2)) > 0 for
λ
1− λ







, F2(V (x3)) > 0 for
λ
1− λ
< x3 < 1, (22)
where ( λ1−λ ,
λ
1−λ) is the intersection point of Hλ and Vλ. Recall the denition of N ∈ R
2,M ∈ R2×2
that induce the replicator dynamics in ane coordinates. Given λ we assume that









To get that, and recalling the relation between the coordinates of M and A, we choose the matrix
A such that











With this assumption, now we prove that inequality (21) is satised: Let us denote x := x2 and we
rst calculate F3(x, λ(x− 1)) and F2(x, λ(x− 1)),
F3(x, λ(1− x)) = N3 +m32x+m33λ(1− x)−

































λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(1 + 1
λ
x+ 2λ(1− x))]
= 1 + 2λ+ (
1
λ
− 2λ)x− [2λ2 + λ+ (3− λ− 4λ2)x+ 2λ2x2]
= 1 + λ− 2λ2 + (1
λ
− λ+ 4λ2 − 3)x− 2λ2x2,
F2(x, λ(1− x)) = N2 +m22x+m23λ(1− x)−






























λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(1 + 1
λ
x+ 2λ(1− x))]
= 2 + x− [x+ 2x2 + (1− x)[1 + λ+ 2λ2 + (1− 2λ2)x]]
= (1− x)[2(1 + x)− [1 + λ+ 2λ2 + (1− 2λ2)x]]
= (1− x)[1− λ− 2λ2 + (1 + 2λ2)x].
Therefore, on one hand observe that 1 + λ − 2λ2 + ( 1λ − λ + 4λ
2 − 3)x − 2λ2x2 is a quadratic
polynomial with negative leading term that is positive at 1 and λ1−λ (provided that |λ| is small) so
is positive for λλ−1 < x < 1, on the other hand (1 − x)[1 − λ − 2λ
2 + (1 + 2λ2)x] is positive in the
same range, so
λ(x− 1)F3(x, λ(x− 1))
|xF2(x, λ(x− 1))|
=
λ[1 + λ− 2λ2 + ( 1λ − λ+ 4λ
2 − 3)x− 2λ2x2]
x[1− λ− 2λ2 + (1 + 2λ2)x]
;
since the minimum of the numerator is attained at λ1−λ getting a value close to 1 and the maximum
of the denominator is attained at 1 getting a value close to 2, follows that in the range λλ−1 < x < 1
holds















Figure 3: Comparing strategies by pairs is not enough.
and therefore the inequality (21) is proved. The proof of inequality (22) is similar and left for the
reader.
4 Replicator dynamics and Innitely Repeated Prisoner's dilemma
with trembles. Strategies having a uniformly large basin of at-
traction
In the rest of the paper we study the replicator dynamics when the matrix of payos is given by a
nite set of strategies S = {s1, . . . , sn} from an innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with
discount factor δ and error probability 1 − p. It is well known, that any strict sgp is an attractor
in any population containing it. In this case, with Bloc(s, δ, p,S) we denote the local basin of
attraction of s in any set of strategies S and identifying s with s1. Related to that we give the
following denition:
Denition 3. We say that a strategy s has a uniformly large basin if there is K0 verifying that for
any nite set of strategies S containing s and any δ and p close to one, it holds that
{(x1, . . . , xn) : x2 + · · ·+ xn 6 K0} ⊂ Bloc(s, p, δ,S)
where n = cardinal(S).
One particular case of previous denition is when S has only one strategy dierent than s. In
this case, and based on remark 5 we can obtain the following remark:
Lemma 11. If s has a uniformly large basin then there exists C0 such that for any strategy s
∗ and
for any p, δ large (independently of s∗) follows that
Uδ,p(s
∗, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)








∗, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s∗, s)
< C0.
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The goal of this paper is to understand which characteristics of strategies lead them to have
uniformly large basin of attraction. We show rst that a strategy that is commonly used in the
literature, grim, does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction. Then, we show that is due
to the fact that grim never forgives a defection. As a positive results we show that another well
known strategy, win-stay-loose-shift, does have a uniformly large basin of attraction under certain
conditions.
5 Grim does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction
In this section, we prove that the strategy Grim (g from now on), which cooperates in the rst
period and then cooperates if there has been no defection before, does not have a uniformly large
basin. To prove it, we are going to nd a strategy s such that the basin of attraction of g when it
is considered the population formed by s and g is arbitrary small provided that δ and p are close






the basin of attraction of g (the smaller pg,s is, the smaller the basin of attraction of g is).
Theorem 3. Grim does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction. More precisely, there exists
a strategy s such that for any population S = {s, g} and ε > 0 small, there exist p0, δ0 such that for
any p > p0, δ > δ0, the size of the basin of attraction of grim is smaller than ε.
Proof. We consider the strategy s that behaves like g but forgives defections in the rst period







From the denition of s, for any h verifying that h0 6= (D,D) and any t it follows that
pg,g(ht) = ps,g(ht) = pg,s(ht) = ps,s(ht).
Therefore,
Uδ,p(s, s/(C,C)) = Uδ,p(s, g/(C,C)) = Uδ,p(g, g/(C,C)) = Uδ,p(g, s/(C,C)),
Uδ,p(s, s/(D,C)) = Uδ,p(s, g/(D,C)) = Uδ,p(g, g/(D,C)) = Uδ,p(g, s/(D,C)),
Uδ,p(s, s/(C,D)) = Uδ,p(s, g/(C,D)) = Uδ,p(g, g/(C,D)) = Uδ,p(g, s/(C,D)),
so
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(g, s) = Uδ,p(s, s/(D,D))ps,s(D,D)− Uδ,p(g, s/(D,D))pg,s(D,D),
Uδ,p(g, g)− Uδ,p(s, g) = Uδ,p(g, g/(D,D))pg,g(D,D)− Uδ,p(s, g/(D,D))ps,g(D,D).
Recalling that s after (D,D) behaves as g and g after (D,D) behaves as the strategy always defect
(denoted as a) and ps,s(D,D) = ps,g(D,D) = pg,s(D,D) = pg,g(D,D) = (1− p)2, then
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(g, s) = (1− p)2δ[Uδ,p(g, g)− Uδ,p(a, g)],
Uδ,p(g, g)− Uδ,p(s, g) = (1− p)2δ[Uδ,p(a, a)− Uδ,p(g, a)].
Therefore, it remains to calculate the payos involving a and g. Also observe that for any path h
if we take k as the rst non-negative integer such that hk 6= (C,C) then for any t > k ps1,s2(ht) =
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ps1,s2(hk)pa,a(σ
k(h)t−k) where s1 and s2 is either g or a and σ
k(h) is a history path that veries
σk(h)j = hj+k.
Therefore
Uδ,p(g, g/hk) = Uδ,p/hk(a, g) = Uδ,p(g, a/hk) = Uδ,p/hk(a, a).







[(1− p)2R+ (S + T )(1− p)p+ p2P ],
follows that


















δt−1R[p2t − pt(1− p)t] +
∑
t>0
δt[S + δL][p2tp(1− p)− pt(1− p)t(1− p)2] +∑
t>0
δt[T + δL][p2t(1− p)p− pt(1− p)tp2] +
∑
t>0
δt[P + δL][p2t(1− p)2 − pt(1− p)t(1− p)p]}.
Therefore
Uδ,p(g, g)− Uδ,p(a, g) = (1− δ)GA(δ, p)
where

























GA(δ, p) = GA0(δ, p) +GA1(δ, p)
where




















































− 1− (1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ
].
Observe that when p, δ → 1 then
Rp2 + (S + T )p(1− p) + P (1− p)2 → R, 1
1− p(1− p)δ
→ 1, 1− (1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ
→ 1
and recalling that (1− δ)L = P̂ = (1− p)2R+(S+T )(1− p)p+ p2P then for δ, p large follows that










In the same way


















δt−1R[(1− p)2t − pt(1− p)t] +
∑
t>0
δt[S + δL][(1− p)2tp(1− p)− pt(1− p)tp2] +∑
t>0
δt[T + δL][(1− p)2t(1− p)p− pt(1− p)t(1− p)2] +∑
t>0
δt[P + δL][(1− p)2tp2 − pt(1− p)t(1− p)p]}.
Therefore
Uδ,p(a, a)− Uδ,p(g, a) = (1− δ)AG(δ, p)
where


























AG(δ, p) = AG0(δ, p) +AG1(δ, p)
where






































































(1− (1− p)2δ)(1− p(1− p)δ)
]
Observe that when p, δ → 1 then







(1− (1− p)2δ)(1− p(1− p)δ)
→ 3
and recalling that (1− δ)L = P̂ = (1− p)2R+(S+T )(1− p)p+ p2P then for δ, p large follows that
(1− δ)AG0(δ, p) 6 2(1− δ)(P − S) (25)
(1− δ)AG1(δ, p) 6 4(1− p)P̂ . (26)





Observe that for any ε > 0 for p, δ large then from inequalities (23) and (25)
(1− δ)AG0(δ, p) 6 ε(1− δ)GA0(δ, p)
and from inequalities (24) and (26)
(1− δ)AG1(δ, p) 6 ε(1− δ)GA1(δ, p),
therefore, for p, δ large





and so the theorem is concluded.
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Theorem 3 shows that the well known strategy grim does not have a uniformly large basin of
attraction given that after a defection it behaves like always defect. In an world with trembles
unforgivingness is evolutionary costly. We formalize next the idea of unforgivingness and and
provide a general results regarding the basin of attraction of unforgiving strategies.
Denition 4. We say that a strategy s is unforgiving if there exists a history ht such that for all
ht+τ with τ = 0, 1, 2... follows s(ht+τ/ht) = D.
Theorem 4. Unforgiving strategies do not have a uniformly large basin of attraction.
The proof is similar to the proof of theorem 3 with the dierence that the rst point of divergence
may not be t = 1.
It remains to be shown that there exists strategies with uniformly large basins of attraction.
To do that we must rst develop some simple way of calculating payos under the presence of
trembles. This calculations will help us prove that there exist strategies with uniformly large basins
of attractions.
6 Eciency and size of basin of attraction; the symmetric case
In the present section we study the relationship between eciency of a strategy and the size of its
basin of attraction. Roughly speaking, full eciency means that strategies cooperate with itself.
We prove, that this is the case for any strategy that hs a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Given a nite path ht, and a pair of strategies s, s
∗ it is dened





Denition 5. It is said that a strategy s is ecient if for any nite path ht follows that
U(s, s/ht) = R.
Question 1. Which is the relation between eciency and being a uniform large basin strategy?
We provide a positive answer to previous question for symmetric strategues:
Denition 6. we say that a strategy s is symmetric if for any nite path ht it follows that
s(ht) = s(ĥt).
Theorem 5. If s has a uniform large basin of attraction and is symmetric, then is ecient.
Previous result establish eciency if the probability of mistake is much smaller than 1− δ. An
easy corollary is the following:
Corollary 1. If s has uniform large basin of attraction and is symmetric, then for any R0 < R
there exists δ0 := δ0(s) such that for any δ > δ0 there exists p0(δ) verifying that if δ > δ0, p > p0(δ)
then for any path ht follows that
Uδ,p(s, s/ht) > R0.
Here it is important to compare the statement of theorem 3 wit theorem 5 and corollary 1. On
one hand, observe that the conclusion of theorem 3 is obtained for any δ > δ0 and any p > p0;
instead, in corollary 1 is for d > δ0 but p > p(δ)with p(δ) strongly depending of δ. On the other
hand, a weake version of theorem 3 can be concluded from corollary 1.
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Lemma 12. If s has a uniformly large basin of attraction, then there exists C0 such that for any






∗, s∗/ht)− Uδ,p(s, s∗/ht) + Uδ,p(s∗, s∗/ĥt)− Uδ,p(s, s∗/ĥt)
Uδ,p(s, s/ht)− Uδ,p(s∗, s/ht) + Uδ,p(s, s/ĥt)− Uδ,p(s∗, s/ĥt)
< C0.
Proof. It follows immediately from lemma 11 considering a strategy s∗ such that the rst deviation
from s occurs at ht (and obviously at also at ĥt).
Proof of theorem 5: Let us assume that there exists a path ht and λ0 < 1 such that
U(s, s/ht) = λ0R
and s is a Sub Game Perfect. We start assuming that h is no symmetric. Then we show how to
deal with the symmetric case using the asymmetric one.
From the fact that s is symmetric, then follows that
U(s, s/ht) = U(s, s/ĥt)
and therefore
U(s, s/ht) + U(s, s/ĥt) = 2λ0R.
Moreover, we can assume that s(ht) = D. We are going to get a strategy s
∗ such that
(i) U(s∗, s∗/ht) = U(s
∗, s∗/ĥt) = R,
(ii) s∗ acts like s after the sequel of ht and ĥt.
To build that strategy s∗, rst we take s∗ such that s∗(ht) = s
∗(ĥt) = C and then we consider all
the equilibriums that follows after ht, ĥt for the pairs s, s; s
∗, s; s, s∗; s∗, s∗:
(i) ht(D,D), ĥt(D,D) for s, s
(ii) ht(C,D), ĥt(C,D) for s
∗, s
(iii) ht(D,C), ĥt(D,C) for s, s
∗
(iv) ht(C,C), ĥt(C,C) for s
∗, s∗.
Observe that the paths involving ht are all dierents and the same holds for the paths involving ĥt.
Now we request that s∗ after ht(C,C) and ĥt(C,C) plays C so
hs∗,s∗/ht = (C,C) . . . (C,C) . . . , hs∗,s∗/ĥt = (C,C) . . . (C,C) . . . ,
and so
U(s∗, s∗/ht) = U(s
∗, s∗/ĥt) = R.
We also request that
s∗(ht(C,D)) = s(ht(C,D)), s
∗(ĥt(C,D)) = s(ĥt(C,D)),
and observe that both requirement can be satised simultaneously and inductively we get that
hs∗,s/ht(C,D) = hs,s/ht(C,D), hs∗,s/ĥt(C,D) = hs,s/ĥt(C,D).
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From the fact that s is symmetric, it follows that each entry of hs∗,s/ht(C,D) = hs,s/ht(C,D) and
hs∗,s/ĥt(C,D) = hs,s/ĥt(C,D) is (C,C) or (D,D) and recalling equality 7 follows that
U(s∗, s/h) + U(s∗, s/ĥ) = U(s, s∗/h) + U(s, s∗/ĥ).
Since, s is a Sub Game Perfect then U(s∗, s/ht) + U(s
∗, s/ĥt) < 2λ0R and therefore U(s, s
∗/ht) +
U(s, s∗/ht) < 2λ0R; by remark (12) follows that if we denote U(s
∗, s/ht) + U(s









Therefore, it follows that there exists γ > 0 such that
λ1 < λ0 − γ.
Now, we consider the path ht(C,D) and we denote it as ht2 and as before we construct a new
strategy s∗2 that satises the same type of properties as the one satised by s
∗ respect to s but on
the path ht2 instead on the path ht. Inductively, we construct a sequences of paths hti , strategies
s∗i and constants λi such that
U(s∗i , s/hti) = λiR (29)









λi+1 < λi − iγ
but this implies that λi → −∞ and so U(s∗, s/hti) → −∞, a contradiction because utilities along
equilibrium are bounded by P.
To nish, we have to deal with the case that ht is symmetric. For that, let us consider the sequel
path ht(C,D). We claim that if U(s, s/ht) < R then
U(s, s/ht(C,D)) < R.
In fact, we can consider the strategy s∗ such that only diers on ht and after that plays the same
as s plays. Since s is a Sub Game Perfect, it follows that Uδ,p(s, s/ht) > Uδ,p(s
∗, s/ht) therefore,










Uδ,p(s, s/ht(C,D)) = U(s, s/ht(C,D))
the result follows.
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7 Revisiting the sucient conditions to have a uniformly large
basin
In the present section we provide general sucient conditions to guarantee that a strategy has a
uniformly large basin (see denition 3), i.e., conditions that implies that a strategy has a uniform
large basin of attraction independent of the initial population, for large discount factor and small
trembles. This is based in theorem 1. In subsection 7.1 we introduce another type of condition
easier to calculate than the previous one, which also implies that a given strategy satisfying it is
a uniform large basin strategy. From now on, we are going to take p > p(δ) where p(δ) is the one
given by remark 46.
Given two strategies s1, s2 to avoid notation, we write
Nδ,p(s1, s2) := Uδ,p(s1, s1)− Uδ,p(s2, s1).
Let s be a subgame perfect. Given s′ and s∗ with Nδ,p(s, s












{Mδ,p(s, s∗, s′), 0}.
Remark 7. If we take the payo matrix associated to a set of strategies that includes s, s∗, s′ and
s = e1, s
∗ = ei, s
′ = ej it follows that Mδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) =
Mij+Mji
−Ni as in lemma 1 and theorem 10.
Remark 8. Observe that in the case that s∗ = s′, the quantity Mδ,p(s, s







So, for the purpose of bounding Mδ,p(s) from +∞ it is enough to take the supreme over Mδ,p(s, s∗, s′).
Observe also that if we only considere the population {s, s∗} then the segment [0, 1Mδ(s,s∗)) is in the
basin of attraction of s (provided that s is identied with e1).
Denition 7. We say that a strategy s satises the Large Basin strategy condition" if it is a
subgame perfect strategy and if there exist δ0 and M0 such that for any δ > δ0 and p > p(δ) there
exists M0(δ) verifying
Mδ,p(s) < M0(δ) < ∞.
We can also dene
M(s) := lim sup
δ,p→1
Mδ,p(δ)(s)
and observe that in this case, if M(s) < ∞ then s has a large basin of attraction (but the size could
depend on δ and p).
Remark 9. It is important to remark that it could hold that lim supδ→1 sups∗{Mδ,p(δ)(s, s∗)} < +∞
but M(s) = +∞. This means that to guarantee a uniform L1−size basin in any population, it is not
enough that a strategy has uniform size of basin against any other strategy.
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Denition 8. We say that a strategy s satises the  uniformly Large Basin condition" if it is a
strict subgame perfect strategy and
M(s) < ∞.
Theorem 6. If s satises the uniformly Large Basin condition, then s has a uniformly large basin.
More precisely, let β be small. Then, there exists δ0 such that for any δ > δ0 (p > p(δ)) and any
nite set of strategies S containing s, follows that s is an attracting point such that
B(s) ⊂ Bsloc(s)
where




and n = cardinal(S).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from theorem 1 and the denition of M(s). In fact, ordering
the strategies in such a way that s corresponds to the rst one and N(s, si) > N(s, sj) if j > i then
it follows that for δ large, then the constant M0 = sup{Mij+Mji−Nii , 0} < M(s)−β and therefore B(s)
is contained in the basin of attraction of e1.
Remark 10. Observe that to guarantee a uniform size of the basin of the attraction independent of
the population, it is enough to bound a condition that only involves another two strategies.
Remark 11. Given a subgame perfect strategy s and a population S, the lower bound of the size of
the basin of attraction of s can be improved taking
Mδ,p(s,S) := sup
Nδ,p(s,s∗)>Nδ,p(s,s′),s′,s∗∈S
{Mδ,p(s, s∗, s′), 0}.

































6 1 then follows that Mδ,p(s) < +∞ if and only if Zδ,p(s) < +∞.
In other words, s is a Large Basin strategy if and only if Zδ,p(s) < +∞. Similarly, dening
Z(s) := lim sup
δ,p(δ)→1
Zδ,p(s),
s is a uniform Large Basin strategy if and only if
Z(s) < +∞.
Question 2. Is the uniformly large basin condition (recall denition 8) a necessary condition for
a strategy to have a uniformly large basin strategy? In other words, does s satisfy the large basin
condition?
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7.1 Asymptotic bounded condition
We provide now a condition that implies that s is has a uniformly Large Basin of attraction. This
new conditions are based on the conditions dened before but are easier to calculate. Moreover, if
a strategy satises them it follows that has a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Denition 9. We say that a subgame perfect strategy s satises the asymptotic bounded condition
if






Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ(s, s∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
< R0, (32)
 there exists R1 such that for any s
∗, s′ that Nδ,p(s, s






′, s∗) + Uδ,p(s
∗, s′)− 2Uδ,p(s, s)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
< R1. (33)
Theorem 7. Let s be subgame perfect strategy satisfying the asymptotic bounded condition. Then,
s has a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Proof. Recalling that Nδ,p(s, s
′) 6 Nδ,p(s, s∗) we need to bound by above the following expression
Uδ,p(s










′, s∗) + Uδ,p(s




Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
+




Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
+





6 R1 + 2R0.
From now on, we denoted
Nδ,p(s, s
∗) := Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s∗, s) (34)
N̄δ,p(s, s
∗) := Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) (35)
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) := Uδ,p(s
′, s∗) + Uδ,p(s
∗, s′)− 2Uδ,p(s, s) (36)
Remark 12. From the proof of theorem 7 follows that M(s) 6 2 + 2R0 +R1.
Remark 13. Observe that if it is assumed that (32) holds, then s satises the asymptotic bounded
condition if and only if s satises the uniformly large basin condition.
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7.2 Having uniform large basin for population of two strategies is not enough
In this section we give an example that shows that when a population of three strategies are
considered it can happen that one of them has a uniform large basin when it is taken the subset of
two strategies but it has not a large basin when the three strategies are considered simultaneously.
In other words, next theorem shows that the example given in theorem 2 can be obtained as the
replicator equation associated to three strategies. In what follows, given a population of three
strategies S = {s, s∗, s′} and its replicator equation (in ane coordinates), the rst strategy is
identied with the point (0, 0). In the theorem below it is considered the repeated prisoner's
dilemma without tremble and the proof in trivially adapted for the cae of trembles provided small
erros of mistake.
Theorem 8. For any λ small, there exists a population of three strategies S = {s, s∗, s′} such that
(i) s is an attractor in S;
(ii) s always cooperate with itself;
(iii) in the population {s, s∗}, s is a global attractor (in the terminology of the replicator equation,
the interior of the simplex associated to {s, s∗} is in the basin of attraction of s);
(iv) in the population {s, s′} s is a global attractor;
(v) the region bounded by Hλ, V + λ and x2 + x3 = 1 does not intersect the basin of attraction of
s.
Proof. Given any small λ > 0, we build three strategies such that identifying s with (0, 0), s∗ with
(1, 0) and s′ with (0, 1) satisfy the hypothesis of theorem 2. We also assume that the strategies s′ and
s∗ deviate from s at the 0−history, s plays always cooperate with itself and so s′(0) = s∗(0) = D.
We xed γ > 0 and, and we take ε small. Observe that provided any ε > 0 small, taking δ large,















0 < R− (b′1R+ b′2T + b′3S + b′4P ) = R− (b∗1R+ b∗2T + b∗3S + b∗4P ) = ε
but
R− (b′1R+ b′2S + b′3T + b′4P ) = R− (b∗1R+ b∗2S + b∗3T + b∗4P ) > γ.
Now, from (C,D) we choose s, s′, s∗ such that
Uδ(s, s
∗) = Uδ(s, s







but in such a way that s′ 6= s∗. To show that it is possible to choose s′ independently of s∗ against




∗, s∗)− Uδ(s, s∗) = Uδ(s∗, s∗)− (b∗1R+ b∗2S + b∗3T + b∗4P ) = −ε,
Uδ(s
′, s′)− Uδ(s, s′) = Uδ(s′, s′)− (b′1R+ b′2S + b′3T + b′4P ) = −ε.
Moreover, we can take s′, s∗ such that
Uδ(s
′, s∗) = Uδ(s




′, s∗)− Uδ(s∗, s∗) = Uδ(s′, s∗)− Uδ(s′, s′) > γ.
So,
Uδ(s
′, s∗)− Uδ(s∗, s∗)




and so choosing ε properly we can assume that the quotient is equal to 1λ .
8 Recalculating payo with trembles
Now, we are developing a criterion to calculate the payo for certain strategies which roughly
speaking consists in approximating the payo using equilibrium paths, provided that the probability
of mistake is small. This rst order approximation allows to prove the asymptotic bounded condition
(see inequalities (32), (33), (39), (41) and lemma 16) for certain types of stratgies (namely strict
subgame perfect strategies, see denition 10). In few words, the dierence in utility between two
strategies can be estimated in the following way (provided that p is suciently close to 1):
• rst, we consider all the paths (on and o equilibrium) up to its rst node of divergence
between the two strategies, namely hk, ĥk (see equalities (37, 38, 40)),
• from the node of divergence we only consider equilibrium payos (see lemma 15 ).
In particular, if s(h0) 6= s∗(h0) then Uδ,p(s, s) − Uδ,p(s∗, s) is approximated by Uδ,p,hs,s(s, s) −
Uδ,p,hs∗,s(s
∗, s).






















where given strategies s1, s2
Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hkĥk) := Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hk) + Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hk).











A similar approach we develop for Bδ,p(s, s
′, s∗) that consists in comparing dierent paths for three
strategies s, s∗, s′. Given any pair of paths h, ĥ where s, s′, s∗ dier (meaning that at least two of
the strategies dier at some nite paths contained either in h or ĥ), there exist k′ = k(s, s′, h), k̂′ =
k̂(s, s′, )̂, k∗ = k(s, s∗, h), k̂∗ = k̂(s, s∗, ĥ), such that s(hk′) 6= s′(hk′), s(ĥk′) 6= s′(ĥk′) and s(ĥk∗) 6=
s∗(ĥk∗). Observe that some of them could be innity.
We take
k(s, s′, s∗) := min{k′, k̂′, k∗, k̂∗}
which is nite and observe that
pss(hk) = ps′s∗(hk) = ps∗s′(hk) = ps∗s(hk) = ps′s(hk)







′, s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(s






δkpss(hk)[Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uδ,p(hs,s/hkĥk)].














Moreover, and to simplify calculations we change the usual renormalization factor 1−δ by 1−p
2δ
p2








Both ways calculating the payo (either with renormalization 1− δ or 1−p
2δ
p2
) are equivalent as they
rank histories in the same way.













p2t+2δtu(at, at) 6 R.





where M = max{T, |S|}.
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Proof. Observe that xed t then ∑
ht
ps1,s2(ht) = 1,
since in the equilibrium path at time t the probability is p2t+2 it follows that∑
ht /∈NE
ps1,s2(ht) = 1− p2t+2.











































Lemma 14. It follows that
Nδ,p(s, s














The next denition is an extension of the denition of subgame perfect strategies.
Denition 10. We say that s is a uniformly strict sub game perfect if for any s∗ follows that given
h ∈ Rs,s∗ then
(1− p2δ)C0 < Uδ,p(hs,s/hk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hk), (43)
for p > p0, δ > δ0 where C0, δ0, p0 are positive constants that only depend on T,R, P, S.






















































































Now we will try to estimate
Uδ,p(s,s)−Uδ,p(s,s∗)
Uδ,p(s,s)−Uδ,p(s∗,s) based on lemma 15.
Lemma 16. If p > p(δ) (giving by equality 46) and s is a uniform strict and there exists D such





Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s∗, s)
< D + 1.
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9 win-stay-loose-shift has a uniformly large basin of attraction
In the present section we show that strategies like win-stay-loose-shift satisfy the conditions intro-
duced in subsection 7.1.
Denition 11. win-stay-loose-shift Let us dene the strategy known as Win-stay lose-shift: f it
gets either T or R stays, if not, shifts. To be a subgame perfect strategy it is required that 2R > T+P.
From now on, we denote win-stay lose-shift as w. See [NS] and [RC].
The next lemma is obvious but we state it since is fundamental to do a series of calculations
related to w.
Lemma 17. Given a nite path ht it follows that w is a symmetric strategy, meaning that
w(ht) = w(ĥt).
Proof. It follows from the fact that
w(C,D) = w(D,C) = D.
Theorem 9. If 2R > T + P then w has a uniformly large basin.
We are going to show that w has a uniformly large basin of attraction strategy. For that, rst
we prove that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect (this is done in subsection 9.0.1), and later we










this is done in subsection 9.0.2 and 9.0.3, respectively.
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9.0.1 w is a uniformly strict subgame perfect.
Given hk we have to estimate
Uδ,p(hw,w/hk)− Uδ,p(hs,w/hk)
where hw,w/hk is the equilibrium path for w,w starting with hk and hs,w/hk is the equilibrium path
for s, w starting with hk.
























b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1
and
U(s, w) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P.
From the property of w, for each T that s can get (s plays D and w plays C) follows that in the
next move s may get either S or P because w plays D, so,
b2 + b4 > p2δb3. (49)
To calculate U(w,w) we have to consider either s(hk) = C, w(hk) = D or s(hk) = D, w(hk) = C.
So, from lemma 17
U(w,w) =
{
R if w(hk) = C
1−p2δ
p2
P + p2δR if w(hk) = D
To calculate U(s, w) in case that s(hk) = D,w(hk) = C, writing R = b1R + b2R + b3R + b4R by
inequality (49) it follows that
U(w,w)− U(s, w) = b2(R− S) + b3(R− T ) + b4(R− P )
> (b2 + b4)(R− P ) + b3(R− T )
> δp2b3(R− P ) + b3(R− T )
> b3[(1 + p2δ)R− (T + P )].
Observing that if s(hk) = D,w(hk) = C, then
b3 > 1− p2δ
and since 2R − (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ and p large (meaning that they are close to one),
then [(1 + p2δ)R− (T + P )] > C0 for a positive constant smaller than 2R− (T + P ) and therefore
(provided that δ and p large are large) follows that
U(w,w)− U(s, w) > (1− p2δ)C0,
concluding that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect in this case.
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In the case that s(hk) = C,w(hk) = D, observe that b2 > 1 − δ and calculating again the
quantities b1, b2, b3, b4 but starting from j > 1 then we get that
U(s, w) = (1− p2δ)S + p2δ[b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P ].
Therefore, writing p2δR = p2δ[b1R+ b2R+ b3R+ b4R] and arguing as before,
U(w,w)− U(s, w) = (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δ[b2(R− S) + b3(R− T ) + b4(R− P )]
> (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δ[(b2 + b4)(R− P ) + b3(R− T )]
> (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δ[δb3(R− P ) + b3(R− T )]
> (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δb3[(1 + δ)R− (T + P )]
since 2R− (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ large (b3 now can be zero)
U(w,w)− U(s, w) > (1− p2δ)(P − S),
proving that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect in this case.
Remark 14. Given ε small follows that for δ large then C0 can be estimated as
C0 = min{P − S, 2R− (T + S)− ε}. (50)
Remark 15. To prove that w is a uniform strict sgp, the main two properties of w used are
(i) it cooperates after seeing cooperation and so U(w,w) = R after w(hk) = C,
(ii) after getting P it goes back to cooperate, so U(w,w) = (1− δp2)P + δp2R after w(hk) = D,
(iii) it punishes after getting S,
(iv) 2R > T + P .
Observe, that the previous calculation does not use that w keeps defecting after obtaining T.
9.0.2 Bounding (47).
First we estimate Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(s, w) and Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(w, s). Recall that from lemma 16 it




Therefore, we have to bound the rst term.
Calculating numerator and denominator.
For the moment, to avoid notation, we denote
U(s, s′) := Uδ,p(hs,s′/hkĥh) = Uδ,p(hs,s′/hk) + U(hs,s′/ĥk).
Observe that if U(w,w)− U(s, w) = B2(R− S) +B3(R− T ) +B4(R− P ), then
U(w,w)− U(w, s) = B2(R− T ) +B3(R− S) +B4(R− P ).
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To avoid notation, let us denote L = U(w,w)−U(s, w) = B2(R−S) +B3(R− T ) +B4(R−P ) so,
B4(R− P ) = L− [B2(R− S) +B3(R− T )] and therefore
U(w,w)− U(w, s) = B2(R− T ) +B3(R− S) + L− [B2(R− S) +B3(R− T )]
= L+B2(S − T ) +B3(T − S)
= L+ (B3 −B2)(T − S)
6 L+B3(T − S)
recalling that in case that b3 6= 0 then L = U(w,w)− U(s, w) > B3[(1 + δ)R− (T + P )] (if B3 = 0
then U(w,w)−U(w,s)U(w,w)−U(s,w) 6 1) it follows that
U(w,w)− U(w, s)
U(w,w)− U(s, w)
6 L+B3(T − S)
L
6 1 + B3(T − S)
B3[(1 + δ)R− (T + P )]
= 1 +
T − S





6 1 + T − S
(1 + δ)R− (T + P )
, (51)
so by lemma 16
Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(w, s)
Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(s, w)
6 2 + T − S
(1 + δ)R− (T + P )
.
Remark 16. The main property of w used to bound (47) is that if b3 6= 0 then
U(w,w)− U(s, w) > b3[(1 + δ)R− (T + P )]
and this follows from the properties listed in remark 15.
9.0.3 Bounding (48)











δkpss(hk)[Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uδ,p(hs,s/hkĥk)].
For the particular case of s = w we divide the paths in two types: either w(hk) = C or w(hk) = D.
In the rst case we claim that
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk) 6 0.
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Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk).
In case that w(hk) = D observe that U(hw,w/hkĥk) = 2
1−p2δ
p2
P + 2Rδ. To deal with this situation
we consider two cases: i) s′(hk) = C or s
′(ĥk) = C, and ii) s
∗(hk) = C or s





Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uhδ,p(w,w/hkĥk) +∑
h:s∗(hk)=C ors∗(ĥk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk).
Case i) s′(hk) = C or s
′(ĥk) = C: In this situation follows that h ∈ R∗(s′, w). We rewrite∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(ĥk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkĥk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkĥk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk) =∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(ĥk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/ĥk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk) +∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(ĥk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/ĥk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk).
Using that h ∈ R∗(s′, w), and again lemma 7 then∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(ĥk)=C






k[S + T − 2P ]
and ∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(ĥk)=C






k[S + T − 2P ]
but since






k[2P − (S + P )]
follows that ∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(ĥk)=C




Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/ĥk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk) 6 Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(s
′, w).
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Case ii) s∗(hk) = C or s
∗(ĥk) = C: In this situation follows that h ∈ R∗(s∗, w), and using this
key statement we conclude in a similar way that∑
h:s∗(hk)=C ors∗(ĥk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/ĥk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk) 6
6 Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(s∗, w)∑
h:s∗(hk)=C ors∗(ĥk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/ĥk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkĥk) 6
6 Uδ,p(w,w)− Uδ,p(s∗, w).
Therefore, recalling that





is uniformly bounded and therefore bounding (48).
9.1 Generalized w for any payo system
Recall that w is a uniform large basin strategy, provided that 2R > S + T . Now, we consider
w−type strategies that are large basin strategy for any payo system.
Denition 12. n-win-stay-loose-shift n−win-stay lose-shift. If it gets either T or R stays; if it
gets S, shifts to D and stays for n−period and then acts as w. We denote it whith wn.
Theorem 10. For any payo set there exists n such that wn is has a uniformly large basin.
Proof. The proof goes following the same steps that we used to prove that w is a uniform Large
Basin strategy when 2R− (T +P ) > 0 but using that for any payo matrix there exists n such that
nR > T + (n− 1)P.
To show that wn has a uniformly large basin of attraction, we calculate the quantities b1, b2, b3, b4
for u(s, wn) as it was done for w in subsection 9.0.1. In addition, observe that for wn it follows that




and if n is large enough then 1−(δp
2)n
1−δp2 > n− 1 and therefore,
b2 + b4 > (n− 1)b3.
Repeating the same calculation done for w, in case wn(hk) = C, s(hk) = D follows that
U(wn, wn)− U(s, wn) > (n− 1)b3(R− P ) + b3(R− T ) > (1− δp2)[nR− T − (n− 1)P ].
In case wn(hk) = D, s(hk) = C, the calculation is similar.
To bound uniformly the quantities (47) and (48) for wn, we proceed in a same way that was
done for w and it is only changed the upper bound 2R− (T + S) by nR− T − (n− 1)P .
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9.2 Examples of strategies with low frequency of cooperation which have large
basin but they do not have uniformly large basin
In what follows, we give examples of strategies with arbitrary low frequency of cooperation which
they have large basin (with size depending on δ and p), however, those strategies do not have
uniformly large basin of attraction (the last assertion follows from theorem 5). In other words,
the lower bounds of their basin shrinks to zero when δ, p → 0. More precisely, they can not have
uniformly large basin due to theorem 5. Those strategies are built combining w with a. Moreover,
we establish some relation between the frequency of cooperation and the lower bounds of the size
of their local basin (but depending on δ and p).
Denition 13. We take n large and b0 < 1, we dene the strategy aw
n,b0 as the strategy that in
blocks of times I lw = [l(n + m0n), l(n + m0n) + n − 1] behaves as w and in the blocks of times
I la = [l(n +m0n) + n, (l + 1)(n +m0n) − 1] behaves as a, where m0 denotes the integer part of 1b0
and l is a non-negative integer.
Theorem 11. For any n large, and any positive b0 the strategy aw
n,b0 is a large basin strategy, but
not a uniform large basin strategy.
Proof. From now on, and to avoid notation, we denote awn,d0 with aw. First we are going to prove
that aw is a uniform strict sgp.
The strategy aw is a uniform strict sgp: The proof is similar to the one performed for w. Let s
be another strategy and given a path h let k be the rst deviation (s(hh) 6= aw(hk)). Either k ∈ I lw
or k ∈ I la] for some non-negative l. It follows that













Observe that provided δ large, then b0 is close to d0. Now we take s and assuming that it diers
in hk and aw(hk) = R, s(hk) = D. In what follows, to avoid notation, with U(., .) we denote
























b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1
and
U(s, w) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P.
Moreover, since in blocks I la aw behaves as a then
b4 > 1− b0 (53)
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From the property that aw behaves as w in blocks of the form [l(n+m0n), (l + 1)(n+m0n) + n],
for each T that s can get on those blocks (s plays D and w plays C) follows that in the next move








b4 > 1− b0 + bwu (54)
b2 + b
w
4 > p2δb3. (55)
Writing
U(aw, aw) = b0R+ (1− b0)P = [b0 − (1− b4)]R+ b1R+ b2R+ b3R+ (1− b0)R
by inequalities (53, 54, 55) it follows that
U(aw, aw)− U(s, aw) = [b0 − (1− b4)]R+ b2(R− S) + b3(R− T ) + (1− b0 − b4)(R− P )
> (b0 + b4 − 1 + b2)(R− P ) + b3(R− T )
> (bw4 + b2)(R− P ) + b3(R− T )
> δp2b3(R− P ) + b3(R− T )
> b3[(1 + p2δ)R− (T + P )].
Observing that if s(hk) = D, aw(hk) = C, then
b3 > 1− p2δ
and since 2R − (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ and p large (meaning that they are close to one),
then [(1 + p2δ)R− (T + P )] > C0 for a positive constant smaller than 2R− (T + P ) and therefore
(provided that δ and p large are large) follows that
U(aw, aw)− U(s, aw) > (1− p2δ)C0,
concluding that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect in the case aw(hk) = C, s(hk) = D.




P + p2δ[b0R+ (1− b0)P ]
where b0 is calculated as in (52), but starting from j = 1. Calculating again the quantities b1, b2, b3, b4
but starting from j > 1 then we get that
U(s, aw) = (1− p2δ)S + p2δ[b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P ].
Therefore, Writing
p2δ[b0R+ (1− b0)P ] = p2δ[b0 − (1− b4)]R+ b1R+ b2R+ b3R+ (1− b0)R]
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and observing that also holds inequalities (53, 54, 55) and arguing as before it follows that
U(aw, aw)− U(s, aw) > (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δb3[(1 + δ)R− (T + P )]
since 2R− (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ large (b3 now can be zero)
U(aw, aw)− U(s, aw) > (1− p2δ)(P − S),
proving that aw is a uniform strict subgame perfect in the case aw(hk) = D, s(hk) = C.
The strategy aw veries the asymptotic bounded condition, but depending on δp2: Bounding (47)
and (48) for aw: To bound Uδ,p(s, s)−Uδ,p(s, aw) we repeat the argument done for w and observe
that the key point is that U(aw, aw/hk) − U(s, aw/hk) > b3((1 + δ)R − (T + S)) which has been
proved when is proved that aw is a uniform strict sgp.
To bound (48) we perform the same approach for w, however the estimates changes depending
on d0. More precisely, given s
′ and s∗ follows that
B(s′, s∗, aw) 6 2(1− d0)(R− P ),




6 2(1− d0)(R− P )
(1− p2δ)(P − S)
.
The strategy aw is not a uniform large basin strategy: It follows from the fact that aw is symmetic
but no ecient.
10 Perturbed Replicator Dynamics
We consider more general equation than the replicator dynamics with the solely restrictions that
individual with low scores dies o and the ones with high ones ourish. More precisely, given a
payo matrix A we consider equations dened in the usual n−dimensional simplex
∑
, of the form
ẋi = xiGi(x)
such that
Gi(x) > 0, if and only if (Ax)i − xtAx > 0
Gi(x) < 0, if and only if (Ax)i − xtAx < 0.
In this case, it follows that
Gi(x) = [(Ax)i − xtAx]Hi(x) (56)
where Hi :
∑
→ R. Moreover, form previous assumption it holds that Hi is always positive in the
simplex
∑
. We require a slightly strong condition: C+ = max{Hi(x), x ∈
∑
, i = 1 . . .m} < +∞,
and C− = min{Hi(x), x ∈
∑
, i = 1 . . .m} > 0.
Then
0 < C− 6 Hi < C+. (57)
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The goal is to show that a version of theorem 1 can be obtained in the present case. More precisely,





is contained in the local basin of attraction of e1. The proof, goes through the same strategy: we
shows that for any k 6 min{ 1M0 ,
C−
2C+






where Fi is (Ax)i − xtAx in ane coordinates. From inequalities (57) it follows that
xiFi(x)Hi(x) < C
+xiFi(x), if Fi(x) > 0; xiFi(x)Hi(x) < C
−xiFi(x), if Fi(x) < 0.
Recalling that Fj(x) = (fj − f1)(x) +R(x) with R(x) =
∑
l(f1 − fl)(x)xl (the variable x is already





































the denition of R0 follows that∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
xiC
















where Ĉ+ = C+ − C−2 , Ĉ
− = C
−
2 . Therefore, rewriting the equation as it was done in the proof of
theorem 1 to nish we have to prove that
N(cx) + xtM(cx) < 0 (58)
where cx = (c1x1, c2x2, . . . , cnxn) and ci is either Ĉ
+ or Ĉ− and N,M are the vector and matrix
induce by A and so. To prove (58), we need a more general version of lemma 10. The proofs are
similar.
Lemma 18. Let c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Rm such that each coordinate is positive. Let Qc : Rm → R
given by
Q(x) = N(cx) + xtM(cx)
with x ∈ Rm, N ∈ Rm, M ∈ Rm×m and cx := (c1x1, . . . , cmxm). Let us assume that Ni < 0 for any









Then, the set ∆ 1
M0





}, is contained in {x : Qc(x) < 0}. In
particular, if M0 = 0 then
1
M0




[AR] Abreu, Dilip, and Ariel Rubinstein. 1988. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated
Games with Finite Automata. Econometrica, 56(6): 1259-81.
[Ax] R. Axelrod; The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books,(1984), ISBN 0-465-02122-0
[AH] Axelrod, Robert, and William D. Hamilton. 1981. The Evolution of Cooperation. Science,
211(4489): 1390-96.
[BiS] Binmore, Kenneth G., and Larry Samuelson. 1992. Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games
Played by Finite Automata. Journal of Economic Theory, 57(2): 278-305.
[BeS] J. Bendor, P. Swistak; The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 290-307
[B] R Boyd, Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game, J.
Theoret. Biol. 136 (1989), no. 1, 47-56.
[BL] Boyd, Robert, and Jerey P. Lorberbaum. 1987. No Pure Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable
in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Nature, 327(1987): 58-59.
[C] Cooper, David J. 1996. Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Com-
plexity in an Evolutionary Setting. Journal of Economic Theory, 68(1): 266-275.
[FL] D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine; Self-conrming Equilibrium, Econometrica 61, 523-545, 1993.
[FM] E. Fudenberg, D. Maskin; Evolution of cooperation in noisy repeated game, The Amercian
Economic Review, Vol 90, No. 2 (May 1990), pp. 274-279.
[FM2] Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. 1993. Evolution and Repeated Games. Unpublished.
[INF] L. Imhof, D. Fudenberg, M. Nowak Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection, PNAS,
August 2, 2005, vol. 102, no. 31, 10797-10800 Applied Social Sciences Mathematics.
[INF2] L. Imhof,D. Fudenberg, M. Nowak, Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift? Journal of Theoreti-
cal Biology 247 (2007) 574-580.
[JLP] Johnson, Phillip, David K. Levine, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2001. Evolution and Infor-
mation in a Gift-Giving Game. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(1): 1-21.
[KMR] Kandori, Michihiro, George J. Mailath, and Rafael Rob. 1993. Learning, Mutation, and
Long Run Equilibria in Games. Econometrica, 61(1): 29-56.
[Ki] Kim, Yong-Gwan. 1994. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner Dilemma.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 28(3): 167-97.
[LP] Levine, David K., and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2007. The Evolution of Cooperation through
Imitation. Games and Economic Behavior, 58(2): 293-315.
[NSTF] M. Nowak, A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, D. Fudenberg Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary
stability in nite populations, Nature, vol 428, 8, April 2004.
[NS] M. Nowak, K. Sigmund, A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, Nature, 364, pp. 56-58, 1993.
44
[RC] Rapoport and Chammah (1965), Prisoner's dilemma: a study in conict and cooperation.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1965).
[R] Rubinstein, Ariel. 1986. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal
of Economic Theory, 39(1): 83-96.
[S] Smith, John M. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
[V] Volij, Oscar. 2002. In Defense of DEFECT. Games and Economic Behavior, 39(2): 309-21.
[YP] Young, H. Peyton. 1993. The Evolution of Conventions. Econometrica, 61(1): 57-84.
Pedro Dal Bó
Department of Economics Brown University




Estrada Dona Castorina 110, 22460-320, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
enrique@impa.br
45
